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COMMENTARY

REHNQUIST OR RORTY?
Carl Tobias•
It's obvious why the United States Supreme Court cannot be
bothered with procedural minutiae, such as properly cross-referencing
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(j) in its proposal to revise Rule
15(c)(3). 1 The Court has been entirely too busy of late dismantling,
through procedural means, the substantive statutory edifice, characterized as "social legislation," that Congress carefully constructed in the
1960s and 1970s.2 The Court has narrowly applied procedural requirements across a broad spectrum. This encompasses the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, substantive measures' procedural provisions
that govern, for instance, intervention and proof burdens, and procedural prescriptions, principally in Title 28 of the United States Code.
Illustrative are numerous opinions of the Supreme Court's 1988 Term,

* Professor of Law, University of Montana. Thanks to Peggy Sanner for valuable
suggestions, to Cecelia Palmer and Charlotte Wilmerton for processing this piece, and to the
Harris Trust for generous, continuing support. Errors of substance or procedure are mine.
1.
This is a postmodern response to Gene Shreve, Eightee11 Feet of Clay: Thoughts 011
Phantom Rule 4(111), 67 IND. L.J. 85 (1991).
2.
See, e.g., Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-83 (1982); National
Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331-34 (1982). See William Lilley ill &
James C. Miller ill, The New "Social Regulatio11," 47 Ptm. INTEREsT 49 (Spring 1977)
(social legislation). See ge11erally Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigatio11 a11d the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 270, 284-85 (1989) [hereinafter Tobias, Public Law
Litigation]. Examples of opinions that procedurally dismantle are Lorance v. AT&T, Inc., 490
U.S. 900 (1989), and Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. l (1985). See generally Carl Tobias,
Judicial Discretion and the 1983 A111e11d111e11ts to the Federal Civil Rules, 43 RUTGERS L.
REv. 933 (1991) [hereinafter Tobias, Discre1io11]; Carl Tobias, Certifica1io11 a11d Civil Righrs,
136 F.R.D. 223, 229-30 (1991) [hereinafter Tobias, Certificatio11].
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in which the Court interpreted various procedural provisions in ways
that disadvantaged the intended beneficiaries of social legislation.3
If the Court's preoccupation seems an implausible explanation,
consider its recent activities from a different perspective. Perhaps
phantom Rule 4(m) was the Supreme Court's first foray into
postmodern absurdity. After all, the Court's allusion to phantom Rule
4(m) is arguably no more absurd than many of its recent opinions.
Take, for instance, the decisions of the Court that have read out of
civil rights legislation, clearly meant to remedy discrimination, any
congressional intent that the judiciary facilitate discrimination victims'
vindication of fundamental civil rights.
Another example is the Court's insistence that Congress legislate
wi~h careful, all-encompassing attention to detail and clairvoyant foresight into every contingency.4 The absurdity of imposing these unattainable standards is illustrated by the Court's own inability to accomplish even the ministerial task of affixing correct letters to the rule
revisions that it proposes. Perhaps Justice Scalia has been reading his
Derrida after all,5 although he apparently has not been reading his
Oliver Wendell Holmes, who said:
A statute may indicate or require as its justification a change in the
policy of the law, although it expresses that change only in the
specific cases most likely to occur to the mind . . . . The major
premise of the conclusion expressed in a statute . . . may not be set
out in terms but it is not an adequate discharge of duty for courts
to say: We see what you are driving at, but you have not said it,

3.
See, e.g., Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989); Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989). See generally Theodore Blumoff & Harold Lewis, The Reagan
Coun and Title Vil: A Co111111011-Law Outlook 011 a Statutory Task, 69 N.C. L. REv. 1
(1990); Carl Tobias, Civil Rights Procedural Problems 3-4, 6-9 (1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
4.
For example, Justice Scalia has been the foremost proponent of a new "plain
meaning" rule, which he applies to demand that Congress legislate with blinding clarity and
minute specificity. See, e.g.. Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 133 (1989)
(Scalia, J., concurring); Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 97 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring). Compare Justice Scalia's dissent in Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, Ill S. a.
2476, 2487 (1991), with the majority opinion in Mortier. See generally Frederick Schauer,
Statutory Constructio11 a11d the Coordinating Function of Plain Meaning, 1990 SUP. CT. REv.
231.
S.
"The Justices have not been reading their Derrida. Indeed, despite the lengthy
importunings of legions of law professors, the Justices have been neglecting to read not only
Derrida, but Foucault, Gadamer, Rorty, and Heidegger as well." Schauer, supra note 4, at
231.
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and therefore we shall go on as before.6
Justice Scalia also seems to have disregarded a related Holmesian
admonition regarding "concessions to the shortness of life. "7
But why should observers take seriously any of the tasks, particularly statutory interpretation and rule revision, that the modern Supreme Court undertakes? It could be contended that the Court does
not take very seriously its major task of construing congressional
enactments and discerning congressional intent, as the Justices go
about undermining two decades of substantive legislation.
It might also be argued that Congress does not take seriously its
responsibility to monitor judicial application of the mandates in statutes that it has enacted. Congress has been too preoccupied with
minor problems, such as balancing the budget and debating the
President's power to conduct hostilities on foreign soil, to address the
substantive difficulties that the Court has created, much less to treat
its procedural foibles. To be sure, Congress has taken certain corrective action, such as its recent passage of the Civil Rights Act of
1991, which remedied some substantive complications that resulted
from the notorious 1988 Term. 8 Even that statute, however, did not
rectify many procedural problems that the Court's ungenerous interpretations have imposed.9
Congress' relative inactivity at least has afforded the benefit of
leaving essentially intact nearly all of the social legislation that it had
enacted during the 1960s and 1970s. But apparently oblivious to the
potential implications of its actions, Congress recently seems to have
joined forces with the Supreme Court. Congress, in passing the Civil
Justice Reform Act of 1990,10 could well facilitate the additional
erosion by the judiciary of litigants• vindication of the very rights that
earlier Congresses had clearly intended to promote in enacting social
legislation. 11

6.
Johnson v. United States, 163 F. 30, 32 (1st Cir. 1908) (Holmes, J.).
7.
See Reeve v. Dennett, 11 N.E. 938, 943-44 (Mass. 1887).
8.
Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071. See generally Tobias, supra note 3.
9.
Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1 (1985), typifies this ungenerous construction. See infra
note 14. See generally Tobias, supra note 3.
10.
Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-82 (1990)),
11.
For example, the Civil Justice Reform Act specifically authorized federal judges to
employ certain practices, such as assertive case management and summary jury trials, that
have considerable potential for abuse when used against litigants, such as civil rights plaintiffs, who have limited resources. See 28 U.S.C. § 473(a) (1990). See generally Tobias,
Discretion, supra note 2, at 942-43. Cases that illustrate this potential for abuse are Kothe v.
Smith, 771 F.2d 667, 669 (2d Cir. 1985); Lockhart v. Patel, 115 F.R.D. 44, 45-46 (E.D. Ky.
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Finally, neither the Supreme Court nor the Congress, in discharging inter-branch, cooperative responsibilities to revise the civil rules
under the Rules Enabling Act, has evinced great solicitude for certain
litigants, such as civil rights plaintiffs, whom Congress meant to
vindicate these rights. 12 Indeed, each branch exhibited a distinct lack
of concern for those parties in adopting the 1983 amendment to Rule
11, which covers sanctions. 13 A similar error was only narrowly
averted with the defeat of later attempts to change Rule 68, governing
settlement offers. 14
So much for all of this pedestrian, doctrinal stuff, even ·if it
involves the deficiencies of two of the preeminent institutions that
purportedly make the United States the greatest democracy in the
world. On to what is truly significant-legal scholarship.
Professor Shreve's postmodern plaint is intriguing. After all, he
was one of the first legal scholars to train the insights of jurisprudence on civil procedure. 15 Not content to rest on his laurels as a
prescient proceduralist, Shreve now challenges readers to consider

1987).
12.
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-74 (1989) (Rules Enabling Act). See generally Stephen
Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015 (1982); Linda Mullenix,
Hope Over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69
N.C. L. REV. 795 (1991). See Tobias, Public Law Litigation, supra note 2, at 339 (neither
evinced great solicitude). See generally Tobias, Discretion, supra note 2, at 961.
13.
Rule 11 apparently has disadvantaged civil rights plaintiffs more than any oilier
federal court litigants. See Carl Tobias, Rule 11 Recalibrated in Civil Rights Cases, 36 Vlll..
L. REV. 105 (1991); Carl Tobias, Rule 11 and Civil Rights Litigation, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 485
(1988-89) [hereinafter Tobias, Civil Rights]; see also Georgene Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical
Analysis, 118 F.R.D. 189, 200-01 (1988). See generally Stephen Burbank, The Transfonnation
of American Civil Procedure: The Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925 (1989).
The Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United
States recently issued a preliminary draft of a proposal to amend Rule 11, which may
ameliorate its adverse effects on these plaintiffs. See Preliminary Draft of Proposal to Amend
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 137 F.R.D. 53, 74 (1991). See generally Carl Tobias,
Reconsidering Rule 11, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. No. 4 (Mar. 1992).
14.
See Stephen Burbank, Proposals to Amend Rule 68-Time to Abandon Ship, 19 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 424 (1986); Tobias, Public Law Litigation, supra note 2, at 310-13. Marek,
473 U.S. 1, apparently has had effects-such as depleting the pool of civil rights lawyers
willing to assume the risk of not recovering attorneys• fees when they pursue civil rights
cases-similar to those that the aborted rule revision efforts could have had. See generally
Laura Macklin, Promoting Settlement, Foregoing the Facts, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 575 (1986); Tobias, supra note 3, at 4-5.
15.
See Gene Shreve, Questioning lntervemion of Right-Toward a New Methodology of
Declsionmaking, 74 Nw. U. L. REV. 894, 894-95 (1980); see also GEOFFREY liAZARD JR.,
REsEARCH IN CIVIL PROCEDURE (1963); Shreve, supra note 1, at 90 n.28 and accompanying
text. See generally Linda Mullenix, The Influence of History 011 Procedure: Volumes of Lagic,
Scant Pages of History, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 803 (1989).
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whither procedure scholarship. The issues that he raises are compelling and defy easy resolution.
As one who inay have dwelt too long in the nether regions by
pursuing doctrinal procedure scholarship 16 (and by writing west of
the Hudson), I could be the wrong person to address these issues. I
am, however, contemplating several courses of action, which
proceduralists and other legal scholars might or might not find responsive.
I may continue attempting to persuade federal judges of the
errors of their ways, although thus far the judiciary has displayed
nearly total disinterest in everything I have suggested. I could take
the recent advice of a former colleague. This person urged that I
simply add a "jurisprudential twist" to my work, a technique that he
may have employed with resounding success by placing two pieces in
elite journals. 17 Perhaps I will follow the example of another former
colleague who has written jurisprudential theory with the most recondite. That individual, who last year authored his first doctrinal piece
ever, recently signed a contract with a major law publisher to write a
treatise.
I may also take the advice of Gordon Liddy, that pre-modem
prankster, who recommended making a virtue out of a necessity.
Liddy followed his own suggestion, capitalizing on Watergate notoriety to command substantial fees for lecturing on the campus speaking
circuit. Perhaps I shall just look on the bright side of things:
postmodemism has liberated legal scholars, enabling us to write almost anything, even pieces that are fun. Our work can now be about
Posner or Picasso,1 8 Scalia or Scarlatti,1 9 Weinstein or
Wittgenstein.20 My next effort could be titled Procedure and Power,
with apologies to Foucault, or Procedural Paradigms, with apologies
to Kuhn. We're all postmodemists now. 21

16.
See, e.g., Carl Tobias, Standing to Intervene, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 415; Carl Tobias,
Rule 19 and the Public Rights Exception to Party Joinder, 65 N.C. L. REv. 745 (1987);
Tobias, Civil Rights, supra note 13.
17.
Did you really think that I would divulge the identity either of the colleague or of
the journals?
18.
See Richard A. Posner, Bork and Beethoven, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1365 (1990).
19.
See Sanford Levinson & Jack Balkin, Law, Music and Other Performing Arts, 139
U. PA. L. REV. 1597 (1991).
20.
See Dennis Patterson, Good Faith, Lender Liability, and Direct Acceleration: Of
Llewellyn, Wittgenstein and the Uniform Commercial Code, 68 TEx. L. REv. 169 (1989).
Cf. Joseph Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REv. 465, 467 (1988) (we•re all
21.
realists now). See also N.E.H. Hull, Reconstructing the Origins of Realistic Jurisprudence: A

